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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to joint devia-
tions. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria were deﬁned in the literature.
One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which coalitions can
plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players re-
ceive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this paper we show that an ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages (assuming that deviat-
ing coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices). Thus the set of ex-ante
strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all other sets
of strong correlated equilibria.
Key words: coalition-proofness, strong correlated equilibrium, common knowledge,
incomplete information, noncooperative games. JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D82.
1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to the play, inﬂuences the set
of self-enforcing outcomes of a non-cooperative game. The communication al-
lows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated strategy
proﬁle as a feasible non-biding agreement. For such an agreement to be self-
enforcing, it has to be stable against plausible coalitional deviations. Two
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notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong cor-
related equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against all coalitional deviations,
and a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against
self-enforcing coalitional deviations (a deviation is self-enforcing if no sub-
coalition has further self-enforcing and improving deviation).
Each notion has a few alternative deﬁnitions. One major diﬀerence among
them, is the stage in which coalitions can plan a deviation from a correlated
agreement. Assume that the correlated agreement is implemented by a medi-
ator who privately recommends each player what to play. The deﬁnitions in
Milgrom & Roberts (1996), Moreno & Wooders (1996), and Ray (1996) are
ex-ante deﬁnitions: In their framework, players may plan deviations before
receiving the recommendations, and no further communication is possible af-
ter recommendations are issued. The deﬁnitions in Einy & Peleg (1995), Ray
(1998) and Bloch & Dutta (2007) are ex-post 2 deﬁnitions: In their framework,
players may plan deviations only after receiving the recommendations.
However, in some frameworks coalitions can plan deviations at all stages.
One example for such framework is an extended game with cheap-talk 3 In
such a framework, the players can mimic a mediator, and implement a large
set of strong correlated equilibria as strong Nash equilibria in the extended
game (Heller, 2008). A coalition can plan a deviation in the early phases of
the cheap-talk when no player has received his recommendation yet (ex-ante
stage), in the late phases when all players have received their recommendations
(ex-post stage), or in an intermediate stage when some of the players know
their recommendations.
A natural question is whether any of the existing notions is appropriate to
such frameworks, or whether new deﬁnitions are needed. In this paper we
prove that the existing ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (a` la Moreno
& Wooders) is resistant to deviations at all stages. The result is based on
three assumptions about the communication framework (which hold in the
cheap-talk framework):
(1) A deviating coalition can use new correlating devices (play a joint corre-
lated deviation).
(2) When a coalition decides to deviate, that decision is common knowledge
2 Referred to as interim in some of the referred papers.
3 Cheap-talk is pre-play, unmediated, non-biding, non-veriﬁable communication
among the players. For a good nontechnical introduction to some of the main is-
sues of cheap-talk, see the survey of Farrel & Rabin (1996).
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among its members.
(3) The players share a common prior about the possible states of the world
in an incomplete information model a` la Aumann (1987).
An immediate corollary is that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria
is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria, as deﬁned in the lit-
erature referred above. One could hope that similar results might be obtained
for the coalition-proof notions. However, in Section 5 we demonstrate that
the ex-ante coalition-proof notion is not appropriate to frameworks in which
coalitions can plan deviations at all stages. In Section 6 we discuss diﬀerent
approaches for coalitional stability, present the diﬀerent notions of strong, and
coalition-proof equilibria, and discuss the implications of our result.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our model and the main
result. The main result is demonstrated in Section 3, and proven in Section
4. We deal with the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and discuss the the
implications of our result in Section 6.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where
N is the ﬁnite (and non-empty) set of players. For each i ∈ N , Ai is player
i 's ﬁnite (and non-empty) set of actions (or pure strategies), and ui is player
i 's utility (payoﬀ) function, a real-valued function on A =
∏
i∈N
Ai. The multi-
linear extension of ui to ∆ (A) is still denoted by ui. A member of ∆ (A)
is called a (correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-empty mem-
ber of 2N . For simplicity of notation, the coalition {i} is denoted i. Given
a coalition S, let AS =
∏
i∈S
Ai, and let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote the
complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated) S -
strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS) to
be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)q(aS) .
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2.2 An Intuitive Description of Our Framework
Assume that the players of a game G (which will be played tomorrow), have
agreed to play a correlated strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A). The players implement
q with the assistance of a mediator who chooses the action proﬁle a ∈ A with
probability q(a). Throughout the day, the mediator calls each player i and pri-
vately gives him his recommendation: ai ∈ Ai. The players do not necessarily
know the order in which the mediator calls the players, or which players have
already been called. During the day, the players can communicate, share in-
formation about their recommendations, and plan coalitional deviations from
the agreement. If all the members of a coalition agree to use a deviation (each,
with his own posterior information, believes that the deviation is proﬁtable),
then it is implemented with the assistance of a new mediator who receives (at
the end of the day) the recommendations of the deviating players, and gives
each of them a new recommendation. In the next day, each player simulta-
neously chooses an action in G. The proﬁle q is an all-stage strong correlated
equilibrium if, for every calling order and every stage, there is no coalition
with a proﬁtable deviation, as will be formally deﬁned in the next subsection.
2.3 All-stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
We model the situation of incomplete information of the players, by a state
space that describes all possible states of the world (Aumann, 1987).
Deﬁnition 1 Given a gameG, let a state space be a 4-tuple: (Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N):
(1) The 3-tuple (Ω, B, µ) is a probability space.
(2) The (a˜i)i∈N are random variables in (Ω, B, µ), where a˜
i : Ω→ Ai.
We interpret (Ω,B) as the space of all possible states of the world, µ as the
common prior (for the states of the world) for all the players, and ai(ω) as the
recommendation of player i in the state ω.
Remark 2 The state of the world ω ∈ Ω includes a full description of all
parameters that may be object to uncertainty on the part of any player in G.
We assume that all the players share a common prior about the states of the
world. The justiﬁcation of this assumption is discussed in Aumann (1987).
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Given a non-null event E ∈ B and a coalition S ∈ N , let a˜S(E) ∈ ∆(AS) be
the posterior distribution of a˜S = (a˜i)i∈S conditioned on the event E. In order
to model the situation where an agreement is implemented, we require that
the prior distribution a˜S(Ω) to be equal to the agreement distribution.
Deﬁnition 3 Given a game G and q ∈ ∆(A), we say that a state space
(Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N) is a consistent state space if ∀a ∈ A, a˜N(Ω) = q(a).
A (joint) deviation of a coalition S is a random variable (in Ω) that is inde-
pendent of a˜−S (given a˜S).
Deﬁnition 4 Given a gameG, a coalition S and a state space (Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N),
let d˜S =
(
d˜i
)
i∈S be a deviation of S, where the
(
d˜i
)
i∈S are random variables
in Ω: d˜i : Ω → Ai, and the random variables d˜S and a˜−S are conditionally
independent given a˜S.
The interpretation is the following: If the players of S agree to use the devi-
ation d˜S, they implement it with the help of a new mediator. The mediator
receives S -part of the recommendation proﬁle, but he does not receive any
information about the recommendations of the non-deviating players. Thus,
the new recommendations he sends to the deviating players may depend only
on a˜S (and not on a˜−S).
When the members of a coalition S consider to implement a joint deviation,
they are in a situation of incomplete information: each player may know his
recommendation, and may have additional private information acquired when
communicating with the other deviating players. We assume that the deviating
players have no direct information about the recommendations of the non-
deviating players. We model this by the following deﬁnition of a consistent
information structure.
Deﬁnition 5 Given a game G, a coalition S, an agreement q ∈ ∆(A) and a
consistent state space (Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N), let an information structure (of S ) be
a |S|-tuple of partitions of Ω (F i)i∈S, whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common
reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists of non-null events. We say that (F i)i∈S is a
consistent information structure, if ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A, a˜N (F i(ω)) (a) =
a˜S (F i(ω))
(
aS
)
· q(a−S | aS).
We interpret F i as the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true
state of the world is ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of
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F i that contains ω.
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviation is
proﬁtable to him, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ when playing
the original agreement and when implementing the deviation. A player agrees
to deviate, only if the latter conditional expectation is larger. We now formally
deﬁne the conditional expected payoﬀs of each player in each state of the world
ω, when following the agreement and when implementing a deviation.
Deﬁnition 6 Given a game G, an agreement q ∈ ∆(A), a coalition S, a player
i ∈ S, a consistent state space (Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N), a deviation (of S ) d˜S, and a
consistent information structure (F i)i∈S, let the conditional expected payoﬀs
of player i in ω ∈ Ω be:
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when all the players follow the agreement:
uif (ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui
(
a˜N(ω)
)
dµ
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the members of S deviate (by imple-
menting d˜S), and the players in −S follow the agreement:
uid(ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui
((
d˜S, a˜−S
)
(ω)
)
dµ
If the players in S decide to implement a deviation in some state ω ∈ Ω, then
it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player expects to earn if the deviation
is implemented (conditioned on his information). Formally (Aumann, 1976):
Deﬁnition 7 Given a coalition S, a state space (Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N), an informa-
tion structure (F i)i∈S, and ω ∈ Ω, an event E ∈ B is common knowledge at ω
if E includes that member of the meet Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i that contains ω.
We deﬁne a proﬁtable deviation (with respect to a consistent information
structure of a coalition S ), as a deviation that it is common knowledge (in
some state of the world), that each deviating player expects to earn more if
the deviation is implemented.
Deﬁnition 8 Given a game G, an agreement q ∈ ∆(A), a coalition S ⊆ N
and a consistent state space (Ω,B, µ, (a˜i)i∈N), we say that a deviation (of S )
d˜S is a proﬁtable deviation, if there exists a consistent information structure
(F i)i∈S and a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common knowledge in ω0 that
∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). In that case, we say that d˜S is a proﬁtable deviation
with respect to the information structure (F i)i∈S.
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We can now deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle, from which no coalition has a proﬁtable deviation.
Deﬁnition 9 A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage strong correlated
equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation.
2.4 Main Result
A proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a
proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage, when the players have no information
about the recommendations.
Deﬁnition 10 A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation w.r.t. to the
ex-ante information structure (F i)i∈S that satisﬁes ∀i,F i = Ω.
One can verify that our deﬁnition is equivalent to the deﬁnition of Moreno &
Wooders (1996). It is obvious that an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium
is also an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. Our main result shows that
the converse is also true, and thus the two notions coincide.
Theorem 11 A correlated proﬁle q ∈ 4(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium if and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
3 An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
in a 3-player game, and a speciﬁc deviation that is considered by the grand
coalition at some intermediate stage. At ﬁrst look, one may think that this
deviation is proﬁtable to all the players (conditioned on their posterior infor-
mation at that stage), but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not
true. The analysis in this example gives the intuition for our use of a model
of incomplete information a` la Aumann, and for our main result.
Table 1 presents the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1
chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Let q be the proﬁle:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
,
with an expected payoﬀ of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante
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Table 1
A 3-Player Game With An Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1 c2 c3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
strong correlated equilibrium:
• No single player has a unilateral deviation (q is a correlated equilibrium).
• No coalition of two players has a proﬁtable deviation. (Their uncertainty
about the recommendation of the third player prevents them from being
able to earn together more than 20 by a joint deviation.)
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payoﬀ of 30.
Now, consider an intermediate stage in which player 1 has received a recom-
mendation a1, player 2 has received a recommendation a2, and player 3 has not
received his recommendation yet. Each player does not know whether the other
players have received their recommendations. At ﬁrst look, the implementa-
tion of the deviation d˜S(·) = (a3, b3, c3), which gives a payoﬀ of (7, 11, 12), may
look proﬁtable for all the players:
• Conditioned on his recommendation (a1), player 1 has an expected payoﬀ
of 62
3
, and thus d˜S is proﬁtable to him. The same is true for player 2.
• Player 3 does not know his recommendation. His ex-ante expected payoﬀ is
10, and he would earn a payoﬀ of 12 by implementing d˜S.
However, a more thorough analysis of player 3's information, reveals that dS
is unproﬁtable for him. Player 1 can only earn from d˜S if he has received a rec-
ommendation a1. Thus, if player 1 agrees to implement d˜
S, then it is common
knowledge that he has received a1. The expected payoﬀ of players 2 and 3,
conditioned on that player 2 has received a1, is 11
2
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to
implement d˜S, then he must have more information: that his recommendation
is a2. Therefore player 3 knows that if the other players agree to implement
d˜S, then their part of the recommendation proﬁle is (a1, a2). Conditioned on
that, his expected payoﬀ is 15, and thus d˜S is unproﬁtable for him.
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4 A Proof of the Main Result
In this Section we prove our main result. As discussed earlier, one direction is
straightforward, and we have to prove only the other direction:
Theorem 12 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium.
In other words: If a proﬁtable deviation from an agreement q ∈ 4(A) exists,
then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
PROOF. Let q ∈ ∆(A) be a strategy proﬁle (the agreement) that is not an
all-stage strong correlated equilibrium in a game G with a consistent state
space (Ω,B, µ, (ai)i∈N). Thus there exists a coalition S ⊆ N with a proﬁtable
deviation d˜S w.r.t. a consistent information structure (F i)i∈S. This implies
that there is a state ω0 ∈ Ω , such that it is common knowledge in ω0 that
∀i, uid(ω) > uif (ω), i.e., Fmeet(ω0) ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. For each deviating
player i ∈ S, write Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) = ⋃
j
F ij where the F
i
j are disjoint
members of F i, and let ωij ∈ F ij be a state in F ij . We now construct an ex-ante
proﬁtable deviation d˜Se (w.r.t to the ex-ante information structure (F ie)i∈S,
which satisﬁes ∀i, F ie = Ω): d˜Se (ω) =

d˜S(ω) ω ∈ Fmeet
a˜S(ω) ω /∈ Fmeet
Observe that d˜Se and a˜
−S are conditionally independent given a˜S, thus d˜Se is
a well deﬁned deviation. Let uide(ω), u
i
fe(ω) be the conditional utilities of the
players w.r.t. (F ie)i∈S. We ﬁnish the proof by showing that d˜Se is proﬁtable, i.e:
∀i, uide(ω) > uife(ω). Let i ∈ S be a deviating player.
uide(ω)− uife(ω) =
∫
F ie(ω)
(
ui
((
d˜Se , a˜
−S) (ω))− ui (a˜N(ω))) dµ (1)
=
∫
Ω
(
ui
((
d˜Se , a˜
−S) (ω))− ui (a˜N(ω))) dµ (2)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
d˜Se , a˜
−S) (ω))− ui (a˜N(ω))) dµ (3)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
d˜S, a˜−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui
(
a˜N(ω)
))
dµ (4)
=
∑
j
∫
F ij
(
ui
((
d˜S, a˜−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui
(
a˜N(ω)
))
dµ (5)
=
∑
j
uid(ω
i
j)− uif (ωij) > 0 (6)
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Equation 2 is due to the equality F ie(ω) = Ω, (3) holds since d˜
S
e = a˜
S outside
Fmeet, (4) holds since d˜Se = d˜
Sin Fmeet, (5) follows from Fmeet =
.⋃
j
F ij , and the
last inequality is implied by Fmeet ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. QED.
5 Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In the last Section we have shown that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
a` la Moreno & Wooders is also appropriate to frameworks in which players
can plan deviations at all stages. A natural question is whether a similar result
holds for their notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 4 In this Section
we show that the answer is negative, by presenting an example (adapted from
Bloch & Dutta, 2007), in which there is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium that is not a self enforcing agreement in a framework in which
communication is possible at all stages. Table 2 presents a two-player game
and an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium.
Table 2
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-proof
equilibrium. First, observe that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium. Moreno
& Wooders (1996) have proved that in a two-player game, every correlated
proﬁle that is not Pareto-dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. The proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ
of 4. Thus we prove that it is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium,
by showing that any correlated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most
4. Let x = q (a1, b1). Observe that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player
2 would have a proﬁtable deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This
implies q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, because otherwise player 1 would have a proﬁtable
deviation (playing a1 when recommended a2). Thus the payoﬀ of q conditioned
4 Recall (Moreno & Wooders, 1996) that an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equi-
librium is a strategy proﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and im-
proving ex-ante deviation. An ex-ante deviation is self enforcing, if no proper sub-
coalition has a further self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation.
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on that the recommendation proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at
most 4, and because the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommendation
proﬁle is not in A is at most 3, then the total payoﬀ of q is at most 4.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
work in which the players can also plan deviations at the ex-post stage. Assume
that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and player 1 has received a
recommendation a2. In that case, he can communicate with player 1 at the
ex-post stage, tell him that he received a2 (and thus if the players follow the
recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2), and suggest a joint de-
viation: playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive to lie, player 2 would
believe him, and they would both play (a3, b3). This ex-post deviation is self-
enforcing because (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same deviation is not self-enforcing in the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviation that changes
(a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 would have a proﬁtable sub-deviation: play-
ing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a deviation
that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 would have a proﬁtable sub-
deviation: playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Discussion
6.1 Approaches for Coalitional Stability
In this paper we deal with self-enforcing agreements in (one-shot) games in
environments where players can freely discuss their strategies before the play.
Such agreements have to be stable against coalitional deviations. A few notions
in the literature present diﬀerent approaches for coalitional stability.
The ﬁrst approach, is the Pareto dominance reﬁnement, in which the set of
Nash equilibria is reﬁned by restricting attention to its eﬃcient frontier. This
approach is popular in applications due to its advantages: existence (in all
games) and the simplicity of its use. However, when there are more than 2
players, it ignores the ability of coalitions other than the grand coalition to
privately agree upon a joint deviation. 5
5 As discussed in Bernheim et al. (1987) and Yi (1999). The latter paper presents
a set of conditions that if satisﬁed, the two notions of Pareto dominance reﬁnement
and coalition-proof equilibrium coincide.
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Another approach is to explicitly model the procedure of communication as
an extended-form game that speciﬁes how messages are interchanged (see,
e.g.: Farrel & Saloner, 1988; Rabin, 1994; Aumann & Hart, 2003). However,
the results are sensitive to the exact procedure employed, and usually strong
restrictions have to be be made to isolate the desired outcome.
A diﬀerent approach is the farsighted coalitional stability (alternative varia-
tions are discussed in Greenberg, 1989, 1990; Chwe, 1994; Mariotti, 1997; Xue,
1998, 2000). 6 These notions focus on environments where deviations are pub-
lic. At each stage coalitions propose deviations from the current status-quo
outcome, until nobody wishes to deviate further. The set of possible ﬁnal out-
comes is deﬁned using stable sets a` la Von-Neumann & Morgenstern (1953).
This approach is less appropriate when coalitions can privately plan devia-
tions. 7
6.2 Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria
In this paper we focus on the approach of coalition-proof and strong equi-
libria. A Nash equilibrium is strong (Aumann, 1959) if no coalition, taking
the actions of its complement as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way
that beneﬁts all of its members. The main drawback of this notion, is that
it exists in only a relatively small set of games. 8 Bernheim et al., 1987, has
presented a wider reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium, which exists in more games:
a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if no
coalition has a proﬁtable self-enforcing deviation. A deviation is self-enforcing
if no proper sub-coalition has a further self-enforcing and improving devia-
tion. 9 The notion of coalition-proof equilibrium has been useful in a variety
6 Also called negotiation-proof equilibrium and full coalitional equilibrium.
7 Xue (2000, Table 1) presents an example for the diﬀerence between a negotiation-
proof equilibrium and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Observe that the
negotiation-proof equilibrium in this example (the proﬁle (U,L,A)) is not a plausible
outcome if the coalition ({1, 2}) can privately deviate.
8 Examples for games where strong Nash equilibria exist are congestion games
(Holzman & Law-Yone, 1997); games where the preferences satisfying independence
of irrelevant choices, anonymity, and partial rivalry (Konishi et al., 1997a); and games
where the core of the cooperative game derived from the original normal form game,
is non-empty (see Konishi et al., 1997b, and the references within). The latter paper
also presents conditions for the equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equi-
libria (independence of irrelevant choices and population monotonicity property).
9 Observe that only members of the deviating coalition may contemplate deviations
from the deviation. This rules out the possibility that members of the deviating
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of applied contexts, such as: menu auctions (Bernheim & Whinston, 1986),
oligopolies (Bernheim & Whinston, 1987; Thoron, 1998; Delgado & Moreno,
2004; Delgado, 2006), and common agency games (Konishi et al., 1999).
These notions focus on environments where coalitions can privately commu-
nicate before the play, and plan a joint deviation. However, they ignore the
fact that the same private communication allow the players to correlate their
moves. This deﬁciency is overcome by the notions of strong and coalition-
proof correlated equilibria. A correlated equilibrium is strong if no coalition
has a (possibly correlated) joint deviation that beneﬁts all of its members. The
close connection between strong correlated equilibrium and private pre-play
communication is demonstrated by:
• The result in Heller (2008), which shows that any punishable 10 (ex-ante)
strong correlated equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium in an extended
game with cheap-talk. 11
• The example in Moreno & Wooders (1998) of an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium that is the only plausible outcome of the game (with pre-play
communication), as experimentally demonstrated in the referred paper.
6.3 Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria
A deﬁciency of the notion of strong correlated equilibrium, is that there are
six diﬀerent variants of it in the literature: three ex-ante notions and three ex-
post notions. In this subsection we present those notions, the relations among
them, and the implications of our result.
Notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in Moreno
& Wooders (1996), Ray (1996) and Milgrom & Roberts (1996). As discussed
in Section 2, our ex-ante deﬁnition is equivalent to the deﬁnition of Moreno
& Wooders. In the framework of Ray, deviating coalitions are not allowed to
coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone not included in this
coalition. This limitation has been criticized, especially by the literature that deals
with the farsighted coalitional stability approach (described earlier).
10 Loosely speaking, a strategy proﬁle is punishable if it Pareto-dominates another
strategy proﬁle, even when the deviating players do a joint scheme.
11 The implementation presented in Heller (2008) is only as a bn/2c-strong correlated
equilibrium (an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations of coalitions with less than
n/2 players). If one assumes that the players are computationally restricted and one-
way functions exist, then the implementation can be as a strong Nash equilibrium
(as discussed in Lepinski et al., 2004 and Abraham et al., 2006).
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construct new correlating devices, and are limited to use only uncorrelated
deviations. 12 In the framework of Milgrom & Roberts only some of the coali-
tions can communicate and coordinate deviations. In both cases the sets of
feasible deviations is included in our set of deviations, and thus our set of
ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium can be deﬁned in our framework, as
a proﬁle which is resistant to deviations at the ex-post stage when each player
knows his recommendation (i.e., no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation
w.r.t. to an ex-post information structure (F i)i∈S, in which: ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈
S, ∃ai ∈ Ai s.t. a˜i (F i(ω)) (ai) = 1).
Notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria have been presented in Einy
& Peleg (1995), Ray (1998) and Bloch & Dutta (2007). In the framework
of Einy & Peleg, a deviating coalition can only use deviations that improve
the conditional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation
proﬁles. 13 In the framework of Ray, a coalition S can only use pure deviations
(functions dS : AS → AS). In the framework of Bloch & Dutta, a coalition S
can only use deviations that are implemented iﬀ the recommendation proﬁle
aS is included in some set ES ⊆ AS which satisﬁes:
(1) If aS ∈ ES, each player earns from implementing the deviation.
(2) If aS /∈ ES, at least one player looses from implementing the deviation.
It can be shown that those conditions imply the existence of a proﬁtable devi-
ation in our framework. (The information structure is such that each deviator
would know his recommendation and whether aS(ω) ∈ ES.) Thus our set of
ex-post strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
The main result of this paper, reveals inclusion relations among the diﬀer-
ent notions of strong correlated equilibria, which described in Fig. 1. 14 Thus,
Moreno & Wooders ex-ante notion is much more robust than originally pre-
12 In Ray's setup, the mediator can send an indirect signal to each player (holding
more information than the recommendation itself). In that case, the uncorrelated
deviation is a function from the set of S -part of the signals to the set of uncorrelated
S -strategy proﬁles. In our framework, in which coalitions can use new correlating de-
vices, any ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that can be implemented by indirect
signals, can also be implemented by a direct correlating device.
13 In our notations, it is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω) in every
ω ∈ Ω, and not only in every ω ∈ Fmeet(ω0) .
14 See Moreno & Wooders (1996, Section 4) for an example of an ex-post strong
correlated equilibrium that is not an ex-ante equilibrium.
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sented: It is an appropriate notion not only for frameworks where players
can only communicate before receiving the recommendations of the correlated
agreement, but to any pre-play communication framework (i.e., an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium is resistant to deviations at all stages).
Figure 1. Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria (SCE)
6.4 Coalition-proof Correlated Equilibria
A correlated equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition has a (possibly cor-
related) proﬁtable self-enforcing deviation. Again, a deﬁciency of the notion
of strong correlated equilibrium, is that there are six diﬀerent variants of it in
the literature (3 ex-ante and 3 ex-post). 15 It is possible to extend our model
of incomplete information, and deﬁne a notion of all-stage coalition-proof cor-
related equilibrium (by using an appropriate notion of consistent reﬁnements
of information structures). However, the example in Section 5 shows that this
notion does not coincide with the ex-ante coalition-proof notion, nor that there
is any inclusion relations among the diﬀerent coalition-proof notions. 16 Thus,
the notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is not robust: it is sensitive
to the exact communication structure.
15 Conditions for the existence of strong and coalition-proof equilibria in games are
discussed in Moreno & Wooders (1996), Milgrom & Roberts (1996), Ray (1996), and
Bloch & Dutta (2007).
16 The example in Section 5 presents an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilib-
rium that is not an all-stage equilibrium. Based on this, it is possible to construct
a 3-player game with an all-stage coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not
an ex-ante equilibrium, in which the coalition {1, 2} would have a deviation that
induce a similar situation to that described in table 2. Examples in the literature
referred above, show that there are no inclusion relations with the ex-post notions
as well.
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6.5 Extensions of Our Result
(1) Bayesian games: Moreno & Wooders (1996) present a notion of ex-ante
strong communication equilibrium in Bayesian games. Our result can be
extended to this setup as well, to show that an ex-ante strong communi-
cation equilibrium is resistant to deviations at all stages.
(2) k-strong equilibria: In Heller (2008) an ex-ante notion of k -strong corre-
lated equilibrium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all
coalitional deviations of up to k players. Our result can be directly ex-
tended to this notion as well: An ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium
is resistant to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
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